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I. INTRODUCTION
From 1995 through 2003, federal farm program payments to farms
in the United States totaled over $131 billion.1 In the year 2003
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor and Director of the Graduate Program in Agricultural Law,
University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas. Work on this Arti-
cle was funded in part by a research grant from the University of Arkansas
School of Law. Appreciation is extended to Kathryn Baker, a third year law stu-
dent at the University of Arkansas who assisted in gathering relevant cases for
analysis.
1. Environmental Working Group, Farm Subsidy Database, http://www.ewg.org/
farm/regionsummary.php?fips=00000 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) [hereinafter
Environmental Working Group] (showing annual USDA subsidies for farms in
the U.S.); see also Economic Research Service, USDA, Farm Income and Costs:
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alone, American farmers received well over $16 billion in federal farm
program payments. 2 In recent years, these payments have accounted
for eight percent of the gross cash income across all farms3 and almost
one-half of the aggregate net farm income, 4 with almost half of all
farms receiving payments. 5
When a farmer files for bankruptcy relief, payments from the fed-
eral government pursuant to the federal farm programs may well be
the most significant or even the only liquid assets available. There-
fore, it is no surprise that a dispute is likely to arise as to who has a
right to these payments.
Resolution of this dispute should turn on the type of farm program
payment at issue, the timing of the right to payment, the contractual
rights of the parties, and a careful analysis of bankruptcy law. Differ-
ent results are anticipated depending upon the nature of the farm pro-
gram and the timing of the bankruptcy in relation to the right to
payment. Unfortunately, however, reaching a resolution may be made
more difficult by the complex web of confusing court precedents, some
of which demonstrate a lack of understanding of the programs or a
desire to shoehorn legal analysis into a perceived equitable result. Re-
cently, the circuit courts have weighed into the mix, attempting to pro-
vide a clear rule with regard to one specific type of program.6
However, while there have been excellent articles published on federal
Farm Income Forecasts, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefinglfarmincome/data/
GPT7.htm (last modified Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Environmental Research
Service, Forecasts] (confirming farm payment figures by totaling program
payments).
2. Environmental Working Group, supra note 1; Economic Research Service, Fore-
casts, supra note 1.
3. Economic Research Service, USDA, Farm and Commodity Policy: Government
Payments and the Farm Sector, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmPolicy/
gov-pay.htm (last modified Sept. 13, 2005).
4. United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 1 (June 15, 2001) (letter from Lawrence J.
Dyckman, Director of Natural Resources and Environment, to The Honorable
Tom Harkin, Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and For-
estry), available at http://www.goa.gov/new.itmes/d01606.pdf.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 392 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 2004), reh'g
granted, 403 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2005) (analyzing whether crop disaster payments
are included in the bankruptcy estate); Drewes v. Vote (In re Vote), 276 F.3d 1024
(8th Cir. 2002) (analyzing whether crop disaster and market loss payments are
included in the bankruptcy estate).
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farm programs in general, 7 few scholars have delved into the some-
times arcane intersection of farm programs and bankruptcy.8
This Article is an attempt to address this issue by confronting the
fundamental question: When is the federal farm program payment
property of the bankruptcy estate? This Article begins, in Part II, by
identifying some of the most important characteristics of the wide ar-
ray of federal farm programs necessary to form the framework for the
legal analysis. It then, in Parts III, IV, and V, addresses the property
of the estate inquiry, meshing existing precedent with commentary
and specifically addressing the recent circuit court opinions on this
issue in the context of disaster relief. Based on this analysis, the Arti-
cle will conclude with comments regarding future decision making and
new farm programs.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL FARM PROGRAMS
Federal farm programs share a number of basic attributes that
separate the payments they provide from other kinds of farm income
and that are critical to assessing when the right to payment exists.
Despite these similarities, there are also important distinguishing
characteristics that differentiate some programs from others. These
differences are also critical to a determination of when the right to a
farm program payment exists.
A. Basic Attributes of Federal Farm Programs
Federal farm programs share basic attributes that are critical to
an understanding of their special role as a source of farm income.
First, each farm program is specifically created by statute, either as
7. See, e.g., Christopher R. Kelley, The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000:
Federal Crop Insurance, the Non-Insured Crop Disaster Assistance Program, and
the Domestic Commodity and Other Farm Programs, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 141
(2001); Christopher R. Kelley, Introduction to Federal Farm Program Payment
Legislation and Payment Eligibility Law, 2002 ARK. L. NOTES 11; Christopher R.
Kelley, Recent Developments in Federal Farm Program Litigation, 48 OKLA. L.
REV. 215 (1995); Christopher R. Kelley, Recent Developments in Federal Farm
Program Litigation, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1107 (1995); Christopher R. Kelley, Re-
cent Federal Farm Program Developments, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 93 (1999); Allen
H. Olson, Federal Farm Programs-Past, Present and Future-Will We Learn
from Our Mistakes?, 6 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (2001); see also The
National Agricultural Law Center, Farm Commodity Programs, http://nation-
alaglawcenter.org/readingrooms/commodityprograms/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2005)
(containing additional information on federal farm commodity programs).
8. This issue was addressed in an article by the Author and noted farm program
scholar, Christopher R. Kelley in the early 1990s, but this work is long out of
date. See Christopher R. Kelley & Susan A. Schneider, Selected Issues of Federal
Farm Program Payments in Bankruptcy, 14 J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 99 (1992).
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part of a comprehensive farm bill9 or as a separate statutory enact-
ment.10 Each individual program exists only as a direct result of con-
gressional action to create the program. Statutory provisions and the
regulations promulgated through statutory authority control all as-
pects of the programs."
Second, in addition to being created by federal statute, a farm pro-
gram must be funded by Congress. Funding, or a lack of funding, for a
program may be an issue whenever rights to a federal program pay-
ment are considered. Moreover, even if initially funded, a congres-
sional appropriation may be less than is needed if response to the
program is more than anticipated.12 In this case, Congress may or
may not appropriate additional funds to make up for the shortfall.13
Similarly, federal government compliance with obligations under
long-term farm program contracts depend upon annual appropriations
from Congress. 14
Third, each individual farm program is implemented by the United
States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") through the promulgation
of specific regulations15 and the development of internal administra-
9. Congress typically enacts comprehensive legislation setting forth farm policy
every four or five years. This legislation is termed the "farm bill." See Alan R.
Malasky, Christopher R. Kelley & Susan A. Schneider, Resolving Federal Farm
Program Disputes: Recent Developments, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 283, 288
(1993); see also, e.g., Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
15, 16 & 21 U.S.C.) (setting forth the provisions of the most recently enacted farm
bill).
10. See, e.g., Agricultural Assistance Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11
(2003) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3801, 3832, 3841) (authorizing crop
loss disaster assistance for prior crop losses).
11. This is evidenced by provisions in the program regulations that confirm that the
statutory and regulatory provisions will prevail over conflicting provisions in the
contract. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1410.53 (2005) (providing that, "[i]f, after a CRP
contract is approved by CCC, it is discovered that such CRP contract is not in
conformity with this part, these regulations shall prevail, and CCC may, at its
sole discretion, terminate or modify the CRP contract, effective immediately or at
a later date as CCC determines appropriate").
12. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 91 B.R. 731, 732-33 (N.D. Tex.
1988) (explaining the supplemental appropriation that was needed to fully fund
disaster payments under the Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act of 1987), amended by 93 B.R. 475 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Commodity Credit Corporation, USDA, Appendix to Form CRP-1, Con-
servation Reserve Program Contract, available at http://forms.sc.egov.usda.gov/
efcommonleFileServices/Forms/CRPOO01APPENDIX_030501V01.pdf (last visited
Nov. 11, 2005) [hereinafter USDA Commodity Credit Corporation] (committing
the USDA to payment under the contract "subject to the availability of funds").
15. See, e.g., Grains and Similarly Handled Commodities-Marketing Assistance
Loans and Loan Deficiency Payments for the 2002 Through 2007 Crop Years, 7
C.F.R. pt. 1421 (2005).
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tive rules and procedures.16 Each program is administered by the
Farm Service Agency ("FSA"), an agency within the USDA.17 Eligibil-
ity for farm programs, as proscribed by regulation, is determined by
an FSA County Committee made up of local farmers.18
Fourth, each program is based on the voluntary participation of
the farmer. Although economics may provide farmers a great incen-
tive to participate, they are never required to do so. The voluntary
decision to participate in a specific program will bind the farmer to
specific statutory and regulatory requirements.' 9
Fifth, if a farmer chooses to enroll in a federal farm program, the
farmer is required to sign a contract with the Commodity Credit Cor-
poration ("CCC").20 Typically, the contract recites the primary obliga-
tions of the farmer and the government and incorporates by reference
the regulations governing the particular program.2 1 The terms of the
contract are not negotiated by the parties. Instead, they are dictated
by the applicable statutes and regulations. The application process
16. See Christopher R. Kelley & Alan R. Malasky, Federal Farm Program Payment-
Limitations Law: A Lawyer's Guide, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 199, 210-15
(1991) (explaining the origin and importance of the administrative handbooks in
implementing federal farm programs).
17. Before USDA reorganization in 1994-1995, federal farm programs were adminis-
trated by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service ("ASCS"). See
Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture Reorganization
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-354, 108 Stat. 3178 (1994) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
18. See 16 U.S.C. § 590(h)(b)(5) (2000); 7 C.F.R. §§ 7.4-7.18, 7.21 (2005). See gener-
ally Christopher R. Kelley & John S. Harbison, A Guide to the ASCS Administra-
tive Appeal Process and to the Judicial Review of ASCS Decisions, 36 S.D. L. REV.
14, 24-26 (1991).
19. Malasky, Kelley & Schneider, supra note 9, at 289.
20. The CCC is a federally chartered corporation created and governed by the CCC
Charter Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 714-714p (Supp. II 2002). It is "an agency and instru-
mentality of the United States, within the Department of Agriculture, subject to
the general supervision and direction of the Secretary of Agriculture." Id. § 714.
The CCC serves as the fiscal agency for the commodity program and other farm
programs. See Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958) (describing
the CCC as "simply an administrative device established by Congress for the pur-
pose of carrying out federal farm programs with public funds").
21. For example, in order to receive Direct Payments under a current farm program,
a producer must complete and sign the Direct and Counter-Cyclical Program
Contract, Form CCC-509. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., DIRECT AND COUNTER-CYCLI-
CAL PROGRAM CONTRACT, CCC-509 (on file with the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW). A
representative of the CCC will sign when the producer is accepted into the pro-
gram, committing the government to the contract. This contract, along with the
Appendix to Form CCC-509, which sets forth additional terms and conditions and
specifically incorporates the program regulations into the contract, governs the
duties of the parties. Id.
2005]
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occurs when the farmer and a representative of the CCC each sign a
contract that binds both parties to the terms of the contract. 22
B. Distinguishing Characteristics of Different Types of
Farm Programs
While certain basic attributes are shared across the spectrum of
federal farm programs, the programs can be further analyzed accord-
ing to a series of distinguishing characteristics that separate one pro-
gram from another. The differences between the programs make it
inappropriate for one uniform rule to exist for the property of the es-
tate analysis. Whether a program payment is property of a bank-
ruptcy estate should be determined in part based on these
distinguishing characteristics.
The first distinction concerns the farm program's connection, or
lack thereof, to current commodity production. Some programs, most
notably the disaster assistance programs, are directly connected to
production. The farmer's eligibility for the program and the amount of
payment that the farmer will receive under the program is tied to
what the farmer did or did not produce. 2 3
In contrast, many current farm programs are "decoupled" from pro-
duction. These programs "separate the linkage between government
payments to producers and the quantity of a commodity produced or
marketed"2 4 Decoupled payments are made irrespective of any partic-
ular crop currently grown by the farmer.25 Production Flexibility
Contract ("PFC") payments provide an example of a recent program
that was decoupled.2 6 Although the production history of the acreage
that the farmer enrolled in the program was factored into the amount
of PFC payments received, the payment bore no relation to the crops
22. Most federal farm program contracts are available on the USDA website, e-forms
service. See Service Center Agencies, USDA, eForms, http://forms.sc.egov.usda.
gov/eforms/formsearchservlet (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
23. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1480.12 (2005) (explaining the payment calculation for the
Crop Disaster Program).
24. CHUCK CULVER, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LAw CENTER, GLOSSARY OF AGRICUL-
TURAL PRODUCTION, PROGRAMS, AND POLICY (4th ed.), http://www.nationalaglaw
center.org/glossary/index.phtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
25. See generally Economic Research Service, USDA, Decoupled Payments in a
Changing Policy Setting, Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 838 (Mary E. Burfisher & Jeffrey
Hopkins eds., 2004), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer838/
aer838.pdf [hereinafter Economic Research Service, Decoupled Payments]. Note
that the farmer's right to a level of payment may, however, be based on historical
production figures. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1412.502 (2005) (linking Direct Payments
to historical base of production).
26. 7 C.F.R. pt. 1412 (2002). The PFC Program was the first major federal farm pro-
gram that provided for completely decoupled payments, marking a significant
change in U.S. farm policy. See Economic Research Service, Decoupled Pay-
ments, supra note 25, at 1.
474 [Vol. 84:469
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grown during the contract period.27 The Direct Payment ("DP") Pro-
gram that is currently in effect is based upon the PFC, and as such
also provides a decoupled payment.2 8 Direct Payments are not tied to
current production nor are they tied to market price. Payments are
based on rates specified by statute and the producer's historic pay-
ment acres and payment yields.2 9 Not only does it not matter how
much the farmer grows during the program year, with very limited
exceptions, it does not even matter what crop is grown, or if a commer-
cial crop is produced at all.30
A second distinguishing factor is the underlying goal of the pro-
gram. On this basis, federal farm programs can be divided into three
categories-price support, conservation, and disaster assistance. 3 1
Price support programs are enacted with the goal of increasing farm
income. 3 2 Conservation programs seek to minimize the negative envi-
ronmental consequences of farming and encourage conservation prac-
tices. 33  Disaster assistance programs are created by special
legislation enacted in response to crop and livestock damage caused by
natural forces. 3 4 Like the price support programs, they seek to in-
crease farm income, but only insofar as there have been offsetting
losses incurred as a result of a natural disaster. These diverse under-
lying goals may be significant if it is necessary to determine congres-
sional intent in interpreting farm program provisions.
A third factor involves how closely the program is associated with a
specific tract of farm property. While many programs have a connec-
tion with the production history of a particular tract of farmland,
3 5
other programs have a more direct connection with the particular
27. See 7 C.F.R. § 1412.206 (2002).
28. 7 U.S.C. § 7913 (Supp. II 2002); 7 C.F.R. § 1412.502 (2005).
29. 7 U.S.C. § 7913; 7 C.F.R. § 1412.502 (2005).
30. 7 U.S.C. § 7916; 7 C.F.R. § 1412.407 (2005); see HARRISON M. PITTMAN, NATIONAL
AGRICULTURAL LAw CENTER, DIRECT PAYMENTS AND COUNTER-CYCLICAL PAY-
MENTS UNDER THE 2002 FARM BILL: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2003), available at http:l
nationalaglawcenter.orglassets/articles/pittman-programpayments.pdf.
31. This is the classification that is used by the FSA. See Farm Service Agency,
USDA, Services, http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/services.htm (last visited Nov. 11,
2005).
32. See 7 U.S.C. § 1421 (authorizing the Secretary to provide price support to farm
producers through the CCC).
33. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 3831 (Supp. II 2002) (authorizing the Conservation Reserve
Program under "to assist owners and operators of land ... to conserve and im-
prove the soil, water, and wildlife resources of such land").
34. See, e.g., Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.) (creating the Crop Loss Assistance Program).
35. The production history of a specific acreage is memorialized in the determination
of "base." See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 7911 (determining base acres for purposes of the
Direct Payment Program). Base acres help to determine that amount of future
payments received.
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tract of farmland itself. The Conservation Reserve Program ("CRP") is
a clear example of this latter type of program. 3 6 Under the CRP, the
producer receives payments for taking a specific tract of farmland out
of production. These payments are often referred to as rental
payments.3 7
The fourth distinguishing factor concerns the obligations that are
required of the farmer under the program. There are a continuum of
possibilities. Under some programs, few obligations are placed on the
farmer. For example, under the DP Program, the farmer is required
to agree to a rather minimal list of requirements. 38 The farmer need
not grow a specific crop and can proceed to use the land without major
restrictions. 39 In contrast, under other programs, the farmer is con-
tractually bound to detailed and specific ongoing obligations required
under the statute and regulations that implement the program. The
CRP provides an example of this type of ongoing contractual duty.40
36. See 7 C.F.R. pt. 1412 (2002).
37. 7 C.F.R. § 1410.42 (2005), Courts that have evaluated the nature of CRP pay-
ments have split on their legal designation, with some finding them to be rental
payments and others finding that they are not. Compare FDIC v. Hartwig, 463
N.W.2d 2, 5 (Iowa 1990) (holding that CRP payments constitute rent under a
mortgage "rents and profits" clause), with Brown v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re
Koerkenmeier), 107 B.R. 195, 198 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (holding that CRP Program
does not create an interest in real estate sufficient for a characterization of the
payments as rent).
38. The statute authorizing the Direct Payments provides that:
[T]he producers shall agree, during the crop year for which the payments
are made and in exchange for the payments-
(A) to comply with applicable conservation requirements under subtitle
B of title XII of the Food Security Act of 1985;
(B) to comply with applicable wetland protection requirements under
subtitle C of title XII of the Act;
(C) to comply with the planting flexibility requirements of section 7916
of this title;
(D) to use the land on the farm, in a quantity equal to the attributable
base acres for the farm and any base acres for peanuts for the farm
under subchapter III of this chapter for an agricultural or conserv-
ing use, and not for a nonagricultural commercial or industrial use,
as determined by the Secretary; and
(E) to effectively control noxious weeds and otherwise maintain the land
in accordance with sound agricultural practices, as determined by
the Secretary, if the agricultural or conserving use involves the
noncultivation of any portion of the land referred to in subparagraph
(D).
7 U.S.C. § 7915.
39. Id. Planting flexibility requirements restrict only the production of fruits, vege-
tables, and wild rice. Id. § 7916.
40. The statute authorizing the CRP provides that a participating farmer must agree
as follows:
(1) to implement a plan approved by the local conservation district...;
(2) to place highly erodible cropland subject to the contract in the con-
servation reserve established under this subpart;
[Vol. 84:469
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Finally, the length of the contract term can be an important distin-
guishing factor. Farm program contracts can run as long as ten years
(e.g., the CRP)41 although more frequently, one year or one crop sea-
son is the duration.4 2
Each of these factors can be important in assessing the legal obli-
gations of the parties, and by extension, rights to the payments as of
commencement of the bankruptcy case.
III. DEFINING PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the commence-
ment of a bankruptcy case, i.e., the filing of the petition, "creates an
estate."4 3 This estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property" at that point in time.44 In addition, the estate will
include "[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from
property of the estate, except such as are earnings from services per-
formed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the
case."
4 5
Applying this to a federal farm program payment, either the farm
debtor must have had a "legal or equitable interest" in the payment as
of the commencement of the case or the farm program payment must
be characterized as "proceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits of or
from" property of the estate. This inquiry has been particularly im-
(3) not to use the land for agricultural purposes, except as permitted by
the Secretary;
(4) to establish approved vegetative cover (which may include emerg-
ing vegetation in water), water cover for the enhancement of wild-
life, or, where practicable, maintain existing cover on the land,...;
(7) not to conduct any harvesting or grazing, nor otherwise make com-
mercial use of the forage, on land that is subject to the contract, nor
adopt any similar practice specified in the contract... ;
(8) not to conduct any planting of trees on land that is subject to the
contract... , nor otherwise make commercial use of trees on land
that is subject to the contract unless it is expressly permitted in the
contract... ;
(9) not to adopt any practice specified by the Secretary in the contract
as a practice that would tend to defeat the purposes of this subpart;
and
(10) to comply with such additional provisions as the Secretary deter-
mines are desirable and are included in the contract to carry out
this subpart or to facilitate the practical administration of this
subpart.
16 U.S.C. § 3832 (Supp. II 2002); see also 7 C.F.R. § 1410.20 (2005) (explaining
the requirements of participation). Penalties can be assessed if the farmer fails
to comply with these requirements. Id. § 1410.52.
41. 7 C.F.R. § 1410.7 (2005).
42. See, e.g., id. § 1412.401 (providing that DP Program contracts are for one year).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000).
44. Id. § 541(a)(1).
45. Id. § 541(a)(6).
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portant in Chapter 7 bankruptcy, with the trustee claiming the pay-
ments as "property of the estate" and the debtor seeking to retain
them as post-petition property.4 6 Putting aside the potential issue of
an interested secured creditor, the basic delineation of interests is
clear. Either the payments belong to the estate and, unless ex-
empted,4 7 can be distributed to creditors, or they belong to the debtor
as part of the "fresh start" provided by bankruptcy.
Obviously, the inquiry is easiest if the farmer has a farm program
check in hand as of commencement of the case. Unless exempted, this
payment would clearly be property of the estate as a "legal or equita-
ble interest[]" of the debtor.48 The analysis becomes more complex,
however, the further back in time the right to payment is found. For
instance, the debtor may have signed the contract pre-petition, but
performance, including payment, is made post-petition. Going back
further in time, the contract may not have been signed before the
46. For purposes of Chapter 12 bankruptcy, the special chapter of the Bankruptcy
Code for family farmer reorganization, the definition of property of the estate is
much broader, and thus, the farm program payment dispute will typically not
arise. Under Chapter 12, the expanded definition of "property of the estate" is
not limited to interests as of the commencement of the case, but includes property
acquired thereafter. Chapter 12 provides that:
(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified
in section 541 of this title-
(1) all property of the kind specified in such section that the debtor
acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case
is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7 of this
title, whichever occurs first; and
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the com-
mencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or
converted to a case under chapter 7 of this title, whichever occurs
first.
Id. § 1207. Thus, unless the debtor is allowed to claim the payment as exempt,
the payment will be found to be property of the Chapter 12 estate. See First Nat'l
Bank v. Klenke (In re Klenke), Nos. 01-13051, 02-5016, 2004 WL 2192517, at *3
(Bankr. D. Kan. Feb 3, 2004) (holding that post-petition Market Loss Assistance
Program payment was property of the Chapter 12 estate under § 1207, even
though right to payment did not exist as of commencement of the case).
47. Most cases seeking to exempt payments have been rejected. See, e.g., In re
Burke, 251 B.R. 720, 722 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2002) (holding that there was no basis
for the debtors claim that a crop disaster program payment was exempt); In re
Boyett, 250 B.R. 822, 827 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000) (holding that a crop disaster
program payment could not be exempted as a "local" public assistance benefit
under Georgia law); In re Holte, 83 B.R. 647, 648 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (holding
that CRP payments could not be exempted as earnings under Minnesota law); In
re Pritchard, 75 B.R. 877, 878 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (rejecting the debtor's
claim that his federal farm program payments were exempt under non-bank-
ruptcy federal law). But see Wilson v. Sergeant (In re Wilson), 305 B.R. 4, 21
(N.D. Iowa 2004) (allowing the exemption of DP farm program payments under
the section 627.6(8)(a) of the Iowa Code, which allows an exemption for "any pub-
lic assistance benefit").
48. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
[Vol. 84:469
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bankruptcy filing, but nevertheless, as of filing, the program was
available to the debtor. Still further, the program may have been en-
acted by statute as of filing, but at that time it was not yet funded or
implemented. Finally, the program may not have even been enacted
as of filing, but it can be argued that there is a connection to the pre-
petition farming operation.
In each of these instances, two fundamental questions must be ad-
dressed. First, what legal or equitable interest under § 541(a)(1) did
the debtor have in the farm program payment as of the commence-
ment of the case? Second, if the debtor did not have a legal or equita-
ble property interest in the actual farm program payment at the time
of filing, can a link be established to a pre-petition interest, such as a
crop, sufficient for purposes of § 541(a)(6)?
While the answers to these questions must be found in an interpre-
tation of § 541, two other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code require a
similar analysis when farm program payments are at issue. For in-
stance, § 553 governs setoff rights in bankruptcy.4 9 In particular,
when the government attempts to use these rights against farm pro-
gram payments, the critical issue will usually be whether farm pro-
gram payment obligations to the debtor are pre-petition or post-
petition obligations. This inquiry is similar to that involving
§ 541(a)(1), therefore, some of the case law in this area will be relevant
to the analysis.
Similarly, § 552 governs post-petition security interests and
whether a security interest is cut off by the bankruptcy filing.5O When
a secured creditor claims an interest in a farm program payment re-
ceived post-petition, the critical issue may be whether the debtor had
a sufficient interest in the payment as of the commencement of the
case for attachment of the security interest. Again, this inquiry is
similar to that under § 541(a)(1). The security interest can also sur-
vive the bankruptcy under § 552 if the payment is found to be pro-
ceeds of property of the estate, invoking an analysis very similar to
that under § 541(a)(6).
IV. LEGAL OR EQUITABLE INTERESTS AS OF
COMMENCEMENT OF THE CASE
Congressional history confirms that the scope of § 541's coverage is
"broad."51 House and Senate Reports confirm Congress' intention
that "all kinds of property, including tangible or intangible property,
49. See id. § 553.
50. See id. § 552.
51. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6323; S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5868.
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causes of action .. . , and all other forms of property" included under
the previous Bankruptcy Act should be brought into the bankruptcy
estate. 52 Congressional history also confirms, however, that § 541 "is
not intended to expand the debtor's rights against others more than
they exist at the commencement of the case." 5 3 Thus, the initial in-
quiry as to whether a farm program payment is property of the estate
will turn on an analysis of what property interest the debtor had in
the payment as of commencement of the case.
A. Contractual Obligation
As noted, federal farm programs invariably involve a farmer's deci-
sion to enroll in a program by signing a written contract. In determin-
ing whether the debtor had a legal or equitable interest as of the
commencement of the case, the first inquiry should be whether or not
the contract was signed pre-petition. If a pre-petition contract is
found, it is likely that some type of "legal or equitable interest" under
§ 541(a)(1) existed as of the commencement of the case.
The significance of the existence of a pre-petition farm program
contract was highlighted years ago in the seminal farm program case
of Moratzka v. United States (In re Matthieson).54 Although this case
addressed the issue of setoff rather than property of the estate, the
inquiry was similar, as the case turned on whether the debtor had a
right to payment as of commencement of the case. 55 The eventual de-
cision of the district court in this case provides the framework for
much of the subsequent analysis of federal farm program contracts in
bankruptcy.
52. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 367, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323; S. REP.
No. 95-989, at 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868.
53. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 367, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323; S. REP.
No. 95-989, at 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868.
54. 63 B.R. 56 (D. Minn. 1986).
55. The court can allow setoff under § 553 of the Bankruptcy Code if authorized
under non-bankruptcy law and if a mutual pre-petition debt and a pre-petition
obligation is owed. 11 U.S.C. § 553. Courts are split on the issue of whether
setoff is mandatory or permissive if the requirements of § 553 are met. Compare
United States v. Myers (In re Myers), 362 F.3d 667, 672 (10th Cir. 2004) (describ-
ing setoff under § 553 as "neither automatic nor mandatory; rather its applica-
tion rests within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court"), with United
States v. Krause (In re Krause), 261 B.R. 218, 223 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001) (holding
that § 553 does not allow for a consideration of equitable considerations (citing In
re Sauer, 223 B.R. 715, 725-26 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1998))). In Matthieson, the USDA
sought to setoff the farm program payment against a debt the farmer owed to the
USDA. The determinative issue was whether the government had a pre-petition
obligation to pay the debtor pursuant to a pre-petition farm program contract.
Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 59. The trustee argued against setoff, arguing that sign-
ing the contract did not create a sufficient obligation. Id.
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Matthieson involved the appeal of six consolidated Chapter 7 cases.
At issue were payments under the Federal Crop Deficiency Program,
an annual federal farm program for producers of feed grains, rice, cot-
ton, and wheat.56 Farmers were required to produce one of the pro-
gram crops and to "set-aside" certain acreage (i.e., not grow crops on
it), while keeping the set-aside acres free of noxious weeds. If they
complied with these requirements, they had the possibility of receiv-
ing "deficiency payments" if, at a designated time after the usual har-
vest period, the market price for the commodity produced was less
than a target price set by statute. The program was not tied to the
amount that a farmer actually grew or the sale proceeds received, but
rather to the general market price compared to the target price.
Farmers enrolled in this program early in the year by signing a con-
tract. The amount of the deficiency payment if any, was determined
and paid well after harvest. 57
In the cases consolidated into the Matthieson decision, the debtors
signed up for the Deficiency Program prior to filing bankruptcy. At
the time of the filing, however, debtors had yet to fulfill their duties
under the program, and the amount of payment, or even the existence
of a payment obligation from the government was not yet ascertained.
Nevertheless, when a deficiency was determined post-petition, the
USDA58S argued that the deficiency payments that became due consti-
tuted pre-petition obligations that could be setoff against pre-petition
debts owed to the government by the farmers. 5 9
The trustee objected, seeking to preserve the payments for the es-
tate. He argued that because the Deficiency Program imposed specific
performance requirements on the debtor, and because there was not
even a known obligation to pay as of commencement of the case, sim-
ply signing the contract did not give rise to a pre-petition right to pay-
ment. He characterized the Deficiency Program contracts as subject
to various "conditions precedent," including the final condition that a
deficiency actually exist. Accordingly, no obligation to pay arose until
the conditions were met post-petition.60
56. Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 58.
57. See 7 C.F.R. pt. 713 (1985). If there was not a deficiency, the farmer would re-
ceive no payment and would have to pay back any advance payment received at
the beginning of the year in anticipation of a deficiency. Id. § 713.04. In
Matthieson, a deficiency was determined post-petition. Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 58.
58. The ASCS was the former agency of the USDA that administered the federal
farm programs during this time period. See 7 C.F.R. pt. 1421 (2005); supra note
17. This agency is referenced throughout the Matthieson opinion. Matthieson, 63
B.R. 56 passim. For purposes of consistency, this Article will refer only to the
USDA.
59. Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 57-58.
60. Id. at 58. It is unfortunate that this "seminal opinion" discussing farm program
contract obligations was one brought involving a program that required little of
its farmer participants. United States v. Gerth, 991 F.2d 1428, 1431 (8th Cir.
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The court rejected the trustee's argument, finding that the require-
ments of the program were contractual duties rather than conditions
precedent to the obligation. 6 1 The court held that when a Deficiency
Program contract was signed, mutual obligations were created. 62 The
contract thus created a pre-petition obligation that could be setoff
against a pre-petition claim. 63
Although at the time Matthieson was decided there was a split of
authority,64 eventually a majority of courts adopted the Matthieson
analysis with respect to other farm programs and often in other bank-
ruptcy contexts, focusing exclusively on contract signing and ignoring
post-petition program requirements. 65 For example, Matthieson was
influential in the subsequent analysis of the Eighth Circuit Court of
1993). Other programs require far more. See supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
61. Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 59.
62. Id. at 60.
63. Id. There may have been a serious flaw in the trustee's position in Matthieson.
Had the trustee been successful in convincing the court that there was no pre-
petition obligation for purposes of setoff, arguably the payments should have
gone to the debtors rather than to the bankruptcy estates. If no payment obliga-
tion existed for purposes of § 553, there may not have been an obligation suffi-
cient to support a property of the estate analysis under § 541. Nevertheless, as
the trustee lost on this argument, the issue is moot.
64. The case often cited as the competing authority with Matthieson is the Chapter
11 case of Walat Farms, Inc. v. United States (In re Walat Farms, Inc.), 69 B.R.
529 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987). Walat Farms held that a Deficiency Program con-
tract was executory and that if it were affirmed by the Chapter 11 debtor-in-
possession, the new contract would not meet the mutuality requirement of§ 553.
Before Walat Farms, however, other courts rejected the immediate link between
contract signage and the obligation to pay. The Texas bankruptcy court in Hill v.
Farmers Home Administration (In re Hill), 19 B.R. 375 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982),
found that the obligation to pay arose only when the amount, if any, of a defi-
ciency was determined. Matthieson discussed and specifically rejected the Hill
holding. In accord with Hill, the bankruptcy court in Medor v. Lamb (In re
Lamb), 47 B.R. 79 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985), held that payments under the Dairy
Diversion Program were not property of the estate because the debtor had not
completed his contractual performance. Id. at 82. For a discussion of the split of
authority and the progression toward a majority approach, at least with regard to
setoff, see In re Allen, 135 B.R. 856 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992).
65. In re Affiliated Food Stores, Inc., 123 B.R. 747, 748-49 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991);
In re Lundell Farms, 86 B.R. 582, 586-88 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1988); Greseth v.
Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul (In re Greseth), 78 B.R. 936, 942 (D. Minn. 1987);
Buske v. McDonald (In re Buske), 75 B.R. 213, 215-16 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987);
United States v. Parrish (In re Parrish), 75 B.R. 14, 16 (N.D. Tex. 1987); see also
Pinkert v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Pinkert), 75 B.R. 218, 220-21 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1987). For cases which preceded Matthieson or were decided more or
less contemporaneous with it, and that also focus on a contract analysis, see In re
Weyland, 63 B.R. 854, 863 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1986) (finding that rights under the
Dairy Termination Program contract are property of the estate); In re Lee, 35
B.R. 663, 666 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) (describing the acceptance of the debtor's
bid for the Payment in Kind Program as creating "inchoate rights" that passed to
the estate upon bankruptcy filing).
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Appeals in United States v. Gerth,66 where that court found it "persua-
sive" and adopted its reasoning.
There are two aspects of Matthieson that make it a rather odd
leader in farm program analysis. First, Matthieson failed to address
the executory nature of farm program contracts. Subsequent cases
that have considered this issue have generally found that farm pro-
gram contracts are executory contracts under § 365, to be affirmed or
rejected by the Chapter 7 trustee.6 7
An executory contract is defined as "[a] contract under which the
obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract
are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete perform-
ance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of
the other."68 Because most farm program contracts require some per-
formance on the part of the farmer, unless performance has been com-
pleted pre-petition, an executory contract should be found. 69
Unperformed obligations were critical to the trustee's arguments in
Matthieson. Yet, no mention is made of the executory contract issue.
It appears likely that the issue of executory contracts was not
raised by the trustee in Matthieson because the pre-petition contracts
had not been timely assumed and thus were deemed rejected under
§ 365. In support of its rejection of Matthieson, the bankruptcy court
in Walat Farms, Inc. v. United States (In re Walat Farms, Inc.), 70
noted that "[slince rejected executory contracts are themselves consid-
ered pre-petition unsecured claims, [under] § 365(g), the necessary
mutuality for use of § 553 existed; hence, the government obligations
66. 991 F.2d 1428, 1431 (8th Cir. 1993) (allowing government to set off against pre-
petition CRP contract).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Myers (In re Myers), 362 F.3d 667, 674 (10th Cir. 2004)
(finding that because the debtor's PFC had not been affirmed, it was deemed re-
jected under § 365(d)(1)); Walat Farms, 69 B.R. at 531-32 (finding that the
debtor's pre-petition Deficiency Program contract was executory, supporting the
court's holding that the payments were a post-petition obligation that could not
be setofi); Gerth, 991 F.2d at 1431 (finding that the parties were in agreement
that the CRP contract was executory); In re Ratliff, 79 B.R. 930, 933 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1987) (finding that a CRP contract "bears all the classic earmarks of an
executory contract").
68. Walat Farms, 69 B.R. at 531 (citing Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MiNN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973)).
69. See Myers, 362 F.3d at 673 (stating that "[a]gricultural contracts, such as the
PFC, are executory in nature because material performance remains due on both
sides"); Ratliff, 79 B.R. at 933 (observing that under the CRP contract "both par-
ties have ongoing obligations-the government to pay rent and the Debtors to
continue to implement the conservation programs"). However, in a situation
where most obligations have been performed pre-petition, the farm program con-
tract may no longer be executive. See, e.g., Lundell Farms, 86 B.R. at 584 (find-
ing that the farm program contracts were not executory because, as of filing,
there were no material obligations left to perform other than payment).
70. 69 B.R. 529 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
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were available for set-off against the pre-petition crop loans obtained
by the debtors."7 1 It appears that the court in Matthieson need not
have addressed the contract obligation issues for which it is now fol-
lowed, but instead could have allowed setoff on this basis.
Future farm program cases are not likely to be able to avoid the
executory contract issue. The USDA has taken the position that
under most circumstances, a farm program is an executory contract,
and state administrative procedures have been developed to deal with
contracts when the farm debtor has filed for relief in bankruptcy.
These procedures include instructions that an executory contract
must be affirmed or the agency will consider it rejected. 7 2
The trustee's position in cases like Matthieson could be better
framed for future analysis by arguing that, while the government had
no payment obligation as of commencement of the case, the estate did
obtain rights under the pre-petition farm program contract. Under
§ 365, the trustee could choose to either affirm or reject the contract.
If the trustee affirms the contract, the right to payment that flows
from the contract becomes property of the estate, provided that the
trustee performs according to the obligations required by the contract.
If the trustee is unable or unwilling to perform, then presumably no
payment will be made. 73
Second, Matthieson's almost exclusive reliance on contract law
misses a critical aspect of the government's liability and oversimplifies
the analysis of federal farm program law. Farm programs are subject
to a variety of federal funding complications, and as such, farm pro-
gram contracts always include language that negates the govern-
ment's obligation to pay if sufficient funds are not appropriated. Farm
program contracts routinely state that the "CCC agrees, subject to the
availability of funds."7 4
Two early farm program cases recognized the interplay between
the program contract and the availability of funds. In United States v.
Thomas (In re Thomas),7 5 the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas affirmed a bankruptcy court holding in a case in
71. Id. at 532.
72. See, e.g., MINNESOTA FARM SERVICE AGENCY, USDA, MINNESOTA FSA BANK-
RUPTCY HANDBOOK (2d rev. 2003) (available from the Minnesota Farm Service
Agency, 400 AgriBank Bldg, 375 Jackson St., St. Paul, Minn, 55101). According
to this handbook, when a bankruptcy petition is filed by a debtor who participates
in a farm program, the FSA County Executive Director is required to send a let-
ter to the debtor's attorney, copied to the debtor, the bankruptcy trustee, the U.S.
Attorney, and the state FSA Office, advising the debtor that the outstanding farm
program contract is an executory contract.
73. Adding another twist, in Matthieson, it was the debtors who performed the post-
petition obligations. Moratzka v. United States (In re Matthieson), 63 B.R. 56, 58
(D. Minn. 1986).
74. USDA Commodity Credit Corporation, supra note 14.
75. 91 B.R. 731 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
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which the farm debtor had a pre-petition contract, but part of the
funding for the program was appropriated post-petition. 7 6 Before fil-
ing bankruptcy, the farmer signed a contract with the CCC and disas-
ter assistance was authorized by Congress. The appropriated funds,
however, only allowed for a payment of seventy-four percent of the
losses incurred. The following May, after the debtor had filed for
bankruptcy relief, Congress appropriated additional funds by passage
of supplemental disaster legislation that allowed for one hundred per-
cent loss payments. 77 The government sought to setoff against all of
the payments, but the court in Thomas held that rights to the 1987
supplemental payments did not accrue until the post-petition legisla-
tion was enacted.7 8 The court explained that "[n]owhere can we find
that the 1987 money was absolutely owning in February 1987. It was
not even in existence until May, 1987."79 Setoff was allowed against
the funds that were appropriated pre-petition, but not those appropri-
ated post-petition.8 0 The same result was reached independently in
In re Neilson,81 a North Carolina bankruptcy case that addressed sim-
ilar facts.
Neither Thomas nor Neilson discuss the concept of a contingent
interest, and had Matthieson been confronted with these facts, the
court may have found that the government had a contractual obliga-
tion to pay whenever funds were appropriated. Nevertheless, Thomas
and Neilson demonstrate the complexity of the interplay between
farm program contractual obligations and legislative action in a way
that few other courts have. As Neilson correctly stated, "Congress had
no obligation to fully fund the disaster relief program."8 2 In practical
terms, without funding, farm program contract rights are
meaningless.
With these limitations, the Matthieson decision is essentially an
analysis of the contractual obligations under a specific farm program
contract in which program funding has preceded the contract forma-
tion. Cases following and expanding upon its analysis adhere to the
same contractual characterization of the relationship between the gov-
ernment and the farmers who participate in the federal farm
programs.
Given this judicial focus on the importance of the contract, if the
farm program contract is not signed pre-petition, a different result
76. Id. at 735, affg in relevant part 84 B.R. 438 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
77. Id. at 732-33.
78. Id. at 734.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 737.
81. 90 B.R. 172, 175 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1988) (holding that post-petition supplemen-
tal appropriation for disaster assistance program could not be setoff against pre-
petition debt).
82. Id.
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will generally be in order. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
reasoning that is consistent with Matthieson when it held, in Schnei-
der v. Nazar (In re Schneider),83 that the farm program payment at
issue was not property of the estate primarily because the farm pro-
gram contract had not been signed prior to the bankruptcy filing.8 4
The post-petition contract was the basis for the court's holding that, as
of commencement of the case, there was no contractual right to the
payment.8 5
The Schneider case involved Payment in Kind ("PIK") Program
payments that were provided to the debtor in exchange for his agree-
ment not to plant a crop on the subject acreage. The court described
this program as:
an artificial inducement for producers to reduce acreage or divert land that
would normally be used for the production and harvest of certain program
crops. In return for non-production and other services, the producer receives a
like quantity of the commodity that would have been produced, but for partici-
pation in the program.
8 6
Prior to filing bankruptcy, the debtor had requested an eligibility de-
termination for the program, but his request had not been approved.
After filing, the debtor received approval and subsequently signed up
for the program.
The bankruptcy court in Schneider characterized the PIK pay-
ments as "an inseparable part of rights established by debtor in his
pre-petition farming operations."8 7 The district court agreed, but al-
lowed for reimbursement to the debtor for costs incurred in post-peti-
tion contract performance.88 However, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that "because the agreement was not exe-
cuted by the government as of the date the petition was filed, the
agreement is not part of the debtor's estate."8 9
The court recognized that there may be instances where a different
result is reached.9 0 However, the court implied that in order for post-
petition payments received as the result of a post-petition contract to
83. 864 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1988).
84. Id. at 686.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 684.
87. Id. (citing the bankruptcy court ruling). The bankruptcy court may have based
its ruling on a finding that the payments were proceeds of property of the estate
under § 541(a)(6). The proceeds argument is addressed infra at Part V.
88. Schneider, 864 F.2d at 684-85 (citing the district court ruling).
89. Id. at 686. Accord In re Mattice, 81 B.R. 504 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987) (holding
that Deficiency Program payments were not property of the bankruptcy estate
because the contract was not signed before commencement of the bankruptcy
case). Note, however, that the court in Schneider limited its holding to certain
types of farm programs and stated that program payments that "result from the
actual disposition of a planted crop" may be found to be the proceeds of a crop.
Schneider, 864 F.2d at 685 (citations omitted).
90. Schneider, 864 F.2d at 686.
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be property of the estate, something other than contract rights must
form the basis of the debtor's interest.
Looking to the statutory language, either there must be a right to
payment that transcends the contract, creating a "legal or equitable
interest"9 1 prior to the commencement of the case and prior to the
signing of the contract, or the right to payment must be brought into
the estate as proceeds of property of the estate.92 Each of these poten-
tial interests is discussed in turn.
B. Pre-Petition Statute as Creating "Legal or Equitable
Interest"
Given the courts' historical focus on the contractual nature of fed-
eral farm programs, it is somewhat unusual to consider that a farmer
may have a right to payment prior to signing the program contract.
As one court stated, the farm program is "no more than a simple con-
tract with benefits and obligations flowing to both sides." 9 3 Under
this analysis, in most circumstances, the inquiry regarding property of
the estate should end if the contract has not been signed.
However, with regard to certain disaster assistance programs, sev-
eral courts have found that the passage of the statute authorizing the
assistance creates a sufficient interest to constitute property of the es-
tate. Although these courts have not always articulated their reason-
ing clearly, and few have addressed the contract analysis approach,
this holding can best be explained by viewing the debtor's right to par-
ticipate in the disaster program as a "legal or equitable interest" pur-
suant to § 541(a)(1). 94 These cases tend to oversimplify the disaster
assistance programs, which in fact have typically had restrictions on
eligibility, a rigorous application process, the signing of a binding con-
tract, and some post-assistance requirements. 9 5 However, if there are
few future duties imposed on the farmer, arguably, voluntary partici-
pation and contractual obligations can be set aside to directly link the
availability of the program to the right to the payment. There is no
obligation for payment as of the effective date of the statute, but there
may be a right for a farmer to apply that could rise to the level of a
"legal or equitable right." This is best understood, not as a specific
right to payment, but as a right to participate in a program that may
result in a payment.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000).
92. Id. § 541(a)(6).
93. In re Lee, 35 B.R. 663, 666 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).
94. Some of these decisions merge an analysis of § 541(a)(1) with an analysis of pro-
ceeds of property of the estate under § 541(a)(6). The proceeds analysis is dis-
cussed infra at Part V.
95. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. pt. 1480 (2004) (implementing the Crop Disaster Program for
years 2001 and 2002).
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This approach is complicated by post-petition requirements im-
posed on the debtor. Not only is there a rigorous application process to
determine eligibility and the amount, if any, of payment to be re-
ceived,96 but participation in the program may impose additional re-
quirements on the farmer. For example, farmers who receive disaster
assistance are typically required to purchase crop insurance during
each of the next two seasons.9 7
In the case law, this argument is usually buttressed with the alter-
native argument that the payments are proceeds of the lost or dam-
aged crops pursuant to § 541(a)(6). 98 This proceeds analysis under
§ 541(a)(6) presents another set of problems and will be discussed
separately.9 9
A North Dakota bankruptcy court addressed disaster assistance in
Drewes v. Lesmeister (In re Lesmeister),0 0 when it ruled on the at-
tachment of a security interest in a Crop Loss Disaster Assistance
Program ("CLDAP") payment that the debtor applied for and received
post-petition.iOi In that case, the statute authorizing the disaster pro-
gram was enacted pre-petition, but the regulations implementing the
program were promulgated post-petition. Similarly, the application
period for the assistance was not available until post-petition. Conse-
quently, the debtors applied for and received payments several
months after their bankruptcy filing. In finding that the payments
were property of the estate and subject to a pre-petition security inter-
est, the court analogized them to "a right of action for damages not yet
put into suit."102 The court declared that the debtors "were farmers
who had suffered a loss from drought and had a right to payments
under the program the moment the Crop Loss Disaster Assistance
Program became effective."1o3
The court's analogy to a right of action is convincing at first glance.
Like a right of action for damages, before the debtor signs up for the
program, he or she has a claim of crop loss that can be pursued under
the assistance program. Whether or not this claim will be successful
in producing an actual payment does not alter the right to apply for
relief. Some aspects of the court's analysis in Lesmiester raise con-
cern, however. On one hand, the court states that the debtor had a
right to payment as soon as the program became "effective." However,
it is clear that the program does not become effective until implement-
96. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1480.4, 1480.11 (2005).
97. See id. § 1480.7.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2000).
99. The proceeds analysis is discussed infra at Part V.
100. 242 B.R. 920 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1999).
101. Id. at 923.
102. Id. at 924 (citing In re Bates, Bankr. No. 5-88-287 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (un-
published decision)).
103. Id. at 926.
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ing regulations have been promulgated. Moreover, the debtor did not
have a right to payment "the moment" it became effective. In reality,
the debtor had only a right to apply for the program. The court's lan-
guage implies an automatic right of payment that does not comport
with the regulations that eventually did implement the program.
These regulations limited eligibility in a variety of ways depending
upon county average losses, the specific cause of the farmer's loss, the
extent of the loss, and even the farmer's gross revenue.' 0 4 While all of
these eligibility criteria relate to pre-petition facts, nevertheless, the
simplicity implied by the language of Lesmiester is deceiving.
More recently, in Boyett v. Moore (In re Boyett),105 a Georgia bank-
ruptcy court held that a CLDAP payment for pre-petition losses of the
debtor's watermelon and squash crops was property of the estate
under § 541(a)(1), even though the debtor did not apply for the bene-
fits until post-petition.1 0 6 As in Lesmeister, the relevant crop loss oc-
curred pre-petition, and the CLDAP legislation was enacted pre-
petition. The regulations, however, were promulgated post-petition,
and the debtor applied for the assistance post-petition. 0 7 Neverthe-
less, the court held that as of filing, the "[diebtor's entitlement to pay-
ment existed, even though he could not immediately realize that
payment. The post-petition application for payment was merely a
ministerial act, not a qualifying event."1 08 In support of this dimin-
ished view of the importance of the contract, the court distinguished
application for the CLDAP from the farm program contracts that
other courts had found to be executory contracts. The court stated
that the "[dlebtor has not claimed to have and does not have a con-
tract, much less an executory contract. He owes no post-petition duty
to the government."1o9
The court's statement that the debtor had no contract with the gov-
ernment is in error. The application document was a contract, signed
by both the debtor and a representative of the government.110 Simi-
larly, the statement that the debtor owes no post-petition duty is also
in error. In addition to adherence with duties associated with the
post-petition application,"'l under the terms of the CLDAP, farmers
were bound to obtain crop insurance for the 1999 and 2000 crop years,
and failure to do so would subject them to liquidated damages.112
104. See 7 C.F.R. pt. 1477 (1998).
105. 250 B.R. 817 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000).
106. Id. at 822.
107. Id. at 819.
108. Id. at 822.
109. Id.
110. See 7 C.F.R. § 1477.109(d) (2003) (authorizing penalty for debtor's failure to com-
ply with any "term, requirement or condition").
111. See id. § 1477.203.
112. Id. § 1477.108.
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While there is merit to the court's attempts to distinguish disaster
programs from traditional farm programs, the court clearly exagger-
ated those differences.
C. Post-Petition Statute: Circuit Courts Draw the Line
In situations where the statute authorizing disaster assistance was
post-petition, trustees in some cases have, nevertheless, argued that
the payment should be property of the estate. This argument has
taken alternative approaches, alleging that the payment is either a
"legal or equitable interest" under § 541(a)(1) or a proceed of property
of the estate under § 541(a)(6). The proceeds issue will be discussed in
the next Part of this Article. However, focusing on § 541(a)(1) in two
recent cases, the trustee was successful in convincing a bankruptcy
court that the debtor's pre-petition loss and resultant "right" to par-
ticipate in any potential future federal farm program was sufficient to
bring the payment into the bankruptcy estate. While neither of these
opinions stand as good law today, both of the courts' analyses are
instructive.
In Lemos v. Rakozy (In re Lemos),113 the debtor converted his
Chapter 12 bankruptcy case to a Chapter 7 case in July of 1998, sev-
eral months prior to the enactment of the CLDAP legislation in Octo-
ber of 1998. The debtor received his discharge in November, 1998,
and did not apply for CLDAP disaster benefits until April, 1999. The
debtor was determined to be eligible, and in June, 1999, the CCC is-
sued a check for $13,386, which the trustee intercepted and claimed as
property of the bankruptcy estate. 1 14 The bankruptcy court held that
the CLDAP payment was either property of the estate under
§ 541(a)(1) or alternatively as proceeds of property of the estate under
§ 541(a)(6).115
The Lemos holding that the farm program payment was a "legal or
equitable interest" at the time of commencement of the bankruptcy
was based on the "broad proposition that even contingent interests
may constitute property of the estate."1 16 The court described the
farm programs as follows:
The scenario is a common one. Congress frequently and regularly enacts a
variety of farm subsidy programs, including price supports, set-asides, and
disaster relief, which change from year to year. The prospect of a federal pro-
gram being adopted to compensate for farm losses in any given year may
therefore be properly characterized as a contingent interest, which, though it
may never vest if the program does not encompass a particular crop or a par-
113. 243 B.R. 96 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999). The holding in Lemos is no longer a valid
statement of the law, at least in the Ninth Circuit. See In re Stallings, 290 B.R.
777, 781 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003).
114. Lemos, 243 B.R. at 97.
115. Id. at 101. But see Stallings, 290 B.R. at 781.
116. Lemos, 243 B.R. at 99.
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ticular year, is property of the bankruptcy estate when it relates to pre-peti-
tion crops. 1
1 7
Unfortunately, the "scenario" described by the court in Lemos is far
from accurate. While there have been a variety of farm programs in
place since the New Deal, the notion that for every crop loss there is
disaster legislation waiting in the wings is simply not true. Histori-
cally, disaster legislation has generally come about only when there is
evidence of widespread crop failure on a regional basis. An individ-
ual's loss will generally not be compensable if the regional loss is in-
sufficient to generate the attention of Congress, if his or her area is
not specifically designated as a disaster area, or if his or her loss does
not reach the threshold level for compensation.118 Moreover, there
may be program requirements that affect the farmer's right to partici-
pate. The situation is neither as simple, nor as automatic, as the court
in Lemos suggested.
To support its position, however, the court in Lemos cited the case
of Segal v. Rochelle,119 in which the United States Supreme Court
held that a pre-petition loss-carryback that would result in a post-peti-
tion tax refund was property of the estate. 120 The Court in Segal
stated that "'property' [of the estate] has been construed most gener-
ously and an interest is not outside its reach because it is novel or
contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed."121 The loss-car-
ryback could not be used to gain the tax refund until the tax year en-
ded, so the refund was not available as of commencement of the case.
Nevertheless, the Court found that it was "sufficiently rooted in the
pre-bankruptcy past and so little entangled with the bankrupts' abil-
ity to make an unencumbered fresh start that it should be regarded as
'property' [of the estate] ."122 The obvious problem with the applica-
tion of this argument to the facts in Lemos is that in Segal, the law
that supported the tax refund was in place pre-petition. In Lemos,
congressional action to create the authority for the payment had not
yet occurred as of the filing of the bankruptcy.
A Georgia bankruptcy court reached a similar result in Kelley v.
Bracewell (In re Bracewell). 12 3 In this case, the crop disaster program
was also enacted post-petition. Nevertheless, the court held that
"[tihe right to the disaster payment was a pre-petition inchoate right
117. Id.
118. Steffen N. Johnson, A Regulatory 'Wasteland: Defining a Justified Federal Role
in Crop Insurance, 72 N.D. L. REV. 505, 545 (1996).
119. 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
120. Id. at 380.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 310 B.R. 472 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2004), rev'd, 322 B.R. 698 (M.D. Ga. 2005), appeal
docketed, No. 05-11951 (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2005). See infra notes 162-65 and ac-
companying text.
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that vested or became choate post-petition upon the enactment of the
Act. Upon the occurrence of the disaster, Respondent had the right to
collect disaster payments from the government, if such legislation was
passed."1
2 4
The weight of authority, however, rejects these two decisions.
Within the last two years, there have been four related circuit court
opinions. Two circuit courts recently addressed the precise issue of
disaster assistance awarded pursuant to a post-petition statute, a
third issued a related decision involving another federal program, and
a fourth ruled on the property of the estate issue in a different context,
but relied upon the other circuit decisions. Each of these important
decisions is discussed individually.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of CLDAP
payments in Drewes v. Vote (In re Vote), 12 5 holding that the payments
at issue were not property of the bankruptcy estate. 126 The debtor
was a North Dakota farmer who was unable to plant his crops in 1999
because of excess rainfall. He filed for relief in bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 in early September, 1999. As in Lemos and Bracewell, the
statute that authorized disaster payments to the debtor was enacted
post-petition. As a result of the disaster program, the farmer eventu-
ally received $33,238 in payments.
The trustee claimed that the CLDAP payments to the farmer were
property of the estate, arguing that because they related to pre-peti-
tion crop losses, they were "sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy
past" under Segal.12 7 The bankruptcy court denied the trustee's mo-
tion, as did the bankruptcy appellate panel.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that the payments were not property of the estate. 128 The court dis-
tinguished Segal, pointing out that in Segal, the law authorizing the
tax refund was in existence when the bankruptcy was filed.129 There-
fore, the debtor "possessed an existing interest at the time of filing."'130
In contrast, the debtor in Vote had only "a mere hope that his losses
might generate revenue in the future."1 3 1 The court further stated
that to find for the trustee would be to allow the trustee to assert more
rights than the debtor had as of commencement of the case. 132 While
the scope of § 541 is broad, it "is not intended to expend [sic] the
124. Bracewell, 310 B.R. at 477.
125. 276 F.3d 1024 (8th Cir. 2002).
126. Id. at 1027
127. Id. at 1026.
128. Id. at 1027.
129. Id. at 1026.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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debtor's rights against others more than they exist at the commence-
ment of the case." 133
The court in Vote also found support for its decision in a recent
opinion from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Sliney v. Battley (In
re Schmitz).134 Schmitz involved a different kind of federal program,
the Alaska Halibut and Sablefish Management Plan ("AHSMP").
Under this plan, qualified fishermen could apply for and be awarded
Quota Shares and Individual Fishing Quotas, annual catch limits ap-
plicable to future fishing rights. The quotas awarded were based on
fishing done during the "qualifying years" of 1988 to 1990.135
Schmitz filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in April, 1992, and
later received his bankruptcy discharge. The AHSMP was not imple-
mented until January 1, 1994, when the Secretary of Commerce pub-
lished final regulations setting up the program. Schmitz applied for
his quota rights in 1994, but because of a competing application, he
did not receive them until December, 1996. He subsequently sold the
rights. Several months later, the Chapter 7 trustee filed bankruptcy
proceedings to recover the money received from the sale and subse-
quent resale of the quota rights and to revoke the debtor's
discharge.136
The bankruptcy court cited "ongoing federal activity to implement"
a plan at the time of the bankruptcy filing and stated that the rights
that were eventually awarded were "rooted in Schmitz's preban-
kruptcy past."137 For these reasons, the bankruptcy court held that
the quota rights were property of the estate and revoked the dis-
charge.138 The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed.139
The Ninth Circuit reversed.140 The court carefully reviewed the
timing of the creation of the program, and found that although the
program was "under consideration" at the time that the debtor filed
his bankruptcy petition, the Secretary of Commerce had not yet re-
ceived the management council's recommendation to limit fishing.141
This recommendation was not received until over four months after
the Schmitz bankruptcy filing. Proposed rules were not published un-
til almost seven months after the bankruptcy filing, and the eventual
final rules establishing the program were published nineteen months
133. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5868).
134. Id. at 1027 (citing Sliney v. Battley (In re Schmitz), 270 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir.
2001)).
135. Schmitz, 270 F.3d at 1255.
136. Id. at 1255-56.
137. Id. at 1256.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1258.
141. Id. at 1257.
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after the filing.142 The court described the situation as of filing as
follows:
Any number of legal, political or bureaucratic factors can affect whether mere
proposals ever ripen into full-fledged regulations. Rule-making is like base-
ball: It ain't over 'til it's over. On the date that Schmitz filed his petition, he
might have had a hope, a wish and a prayer that the Secretary would eventu-
ally implement the plan then under consideration. However, the fact remains
that as of the date of the petition, Schmitz's 1988-1990 catch history had no
value. At most, there existed the possibility that his prior catch record might
be relevant if a fishing quota program were ever adopted in a form favorable
to him, if his application for such rights were granted, and if he could success-
fully defend against any competing challenge to his application. This sort of
nebulous possibility is not property. 14 3
Just as the Eighth Circuit used the Ninth Circuit opinion in the
Schmitz case as support for its decision in Vote, the Ninth Circuit cited
the bankruptcy appellate panel decision in Vote as support for its hold-
ing.14 4 The court in Schmitz noted the similarity between the cases in
terms of the timing issues and noted that the Vote bankruptcy appel-
late panel emphasized that there was a date certain "when the debtor
became legally entitled to the payments," and that date was post-peti-
tion.145 The Schmitz opinion quotes the bankruptcy appellate panel
in Vote as follows:
As of the date the Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition, he may have had, at
most, an expectation that Congress would enact legislation authorizing crop
disaster or assistance payments to farmers affected by weather conditions in
1999, but there was no assurance that Congress would authorize such pay-
ments or that the Debtor would qualify for them if they were authorized. It
was equally likely that Congress would not pass such relief legislation. Such
an expectancy (or "hope," if you will) does not rise to the level of a "legal or
equitable interest" in property such that it might be considered property of the
estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 1 4 6
Subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Schmitz, the bank-
ruptcy court that decided the Lemos case, In re Stallings,147 was
called to rule on the issue of whether a secured creditor's interest at-
tached to a federal crop loss payment that resulted from a post-peti-
tion statute. The Stallings case involved a congressional
appropriation for reimbursement of crop damage resulting from herbi-
cides used by the federal Bureau of Land Management. Both the es-
tablishment of the reimbursement program and the payment occurred
post-petition.14s The court noted that since its decision in Lemos, "the
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1257-58 (citing Drewes v. Vote (In re Vote), 261 B.R. 439, 444 (B.A.P. 8th
Cir. 2001)).
147. 290 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003).
148. Id. at 780-81.
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legal landscape has changed markedly."149 Citing both Schmitz and
Vote, the court held that the secured creditor's interest did not attach
to the payment.1 50
The Eleventh Circuit weighed in on the issue of property of the
estate in the recent case of Witko v. Menotte (In re Witko).151 Al-
though this case did not involve a federal program or even a statuto-
rily created right, the court, nevertheless, relied in part on the
decisions in Schmitz and Vote. At issue was a malpractice cause of
action caused by the debtor's attorney's negligence in a non-bank-
ruptcy matter. While the alleged actions that formed the basis for a
malpractice claim occurred pre-petition, as of the commencement of
the case, the non-bankruptcy litigation was still in process, and there-
fore no harm had been suffered. 15 2 Looking to state law, the court
found that a cause of action does not accrue until the last element
constituting the cause of action occurs. 153 Therefore, the court held
that as of commencement of the case, the malpractice claim did not
exist and consequently, it could not be property of the estate.154
The most recent circuit court to address this issue is the Fifth Cir-
cuit in the case of Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess).1 55 Burgess was
another case involving post-petition crop disaster assistance. The
debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in August, 2002, and re-
ceived his discharge in December, 2002. The Agricultural Assistance
Act of 2003 became law on February 20, 2003, and provided crop dis-
aster assistance for crop years 2001 and 2002. The earliest date that a
farmer could sign up for the assistance was June 21, 2003. When the
debtor received his assistance check, the bankruptcy was reopened,
and the trustee filed a motion for turnover, claiming the check as
property of the estate. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the
trustee, and the district court affirmed. 156
In a panel decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that as of commencement of the case, the most that the debtor
had was a "mere hope" that Congress would enact future legisla-
tion. 15 7 Acknowledging the broad reading that is given to § 541, and
characterizing contrary decisions as "plausible," the court neverthe-
less found Vote and Schmitz to be "more persuasive." 158 The debtor
had no legal or equitable right to disaster relief absent enactment of
149. Id. at 781.
150. Id. at 782.
151. 374 F.3d 1040 (11th Cir. 2004).
152. Id. at 1042-43.
153. Id. at 1043-44.
154. Id. at 1044.
155. 392 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 2004).
156. Id. at 784.
157. Id. at 786.
158. Id.
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the legislation; therefore he had no right to the relief as of commence-
ment of the case. 15 9
In light of an unpublished panel decision in conflict with Bur-
gess,160 petitions for rehearing both cases en banc were granted in
March of 2005.161 As of this writing, the full court has not issued an
opinion.
In line with these appellate decisions, in March, 2005, a district
court in Georgia reversed the bankruptcy court in the Bracewell
case. 162 In a well reasoned opinion, that court noted that disaster pro-
gram benefits present a difficult analysis: "[T]he post-petition enact-
ment of crop disaster legislation coupled with the retroactive nature of
crop disaster payments ... make the payments difficult to categorize
and analogize with other types of property interests."16 3 However, the
court reasoned that it was the enactment of the legislation that was
essential to the creation of a legally recognizable, albeit contingent
right. The court agreed that "once crop disaster legislation is enacted,
legally significant facts exist upon which a farmer could base a contin-
gent right."'16 4 Prior to enactment, however, no such right exists, de-
spite the existence of a crop failure that may one day spawn disaster
assistance. The court noted that "the mere hope that crop disaster
legislation will be enacted to create the contingent interest . . . is a
different concept. Without the crop disaster legislation, growing crops
and suffering crop loss-no matter how sufficiently rooted to the pre-
bankruptcy past-are of no legal significance and create no right."165
Thus, while there have been attempts to push the "legal or equita-
ble" right to disaster assistance benefits back to before the time that
the statute authorizing the assistance was enacted, these attempts
have largely been rejected by the circuit courts. The next issue to be
discussed, however, is whether these benefits can be tied to the pre-
petition crop losses, becoming property of the estate under § 541(a)(6).
V. PROCEEDS, PRODUCT... OR PROFITS OF OR FROM
PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
In addition to "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in prop-
erty as of the commencement of the case," 166 under § 541(a)(6), the
159. Id. at 787.
160. In re Westmoreland, 110 F. App'x 412 (5th Cir. 2004).
161. Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 403 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2005); Westmoreland v.
Sikes (In re Westmoreland), 403 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2005).
162. Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 322 B.R. 698 (M.D. Ga. 2005), appeal dock-
eted, No. 05-11951 (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2005).
163. Id. at 708.
164. Id. at 706.
165. Id. at 707.
166. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000).
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bankruptcy estate will also include the "[p]roceeds, product, offspring,
rents, or profits of or from property of the estate, except such as are
earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the
commencement of the case." 16 7
Much of the case law regarding the issue of whether farm program
payments are the proceeds of specific crops grown by the debtor has
developed in interpreting secured transactions. In bankruptcy, the is-
sue has often arisen in litigation under § 552 instead of § 541. Section
552 provides that bankruptcy cuts off a creditor's security interest as
of commencement of the case, precluding it from attaching to property
that is acquired post-petition.168 An exception is provided, however,
under § 552(b), allowing the security interest to continue in "pro-
ceeds, product, offspring, or profits" of the collateral if the security
agreement so provides. 169
In order to avoid losing their security interest in farm program
payments acquired by the debtor post-petition, creditors have fre-
quently argued that the payments were proceeds of secured crops
grown by the debtor under § 552(b).170 While the results have been
mixed depending upon the specific program at issue, the majority of
courts have found that a security interest in crops does not attach to
farm program payments. 17 1 Farm program payments have most often
been characterized as "general intangibles" or contract rights rather
than crop proceeds. This result is consistent with the contractual na-
ture of the programs and reflects an understanding that payments
may not even have a relation to crops grown. 172
Looking specifically at the requirements of § 541(a)(6) for including
a farm program payment as property of the estate, two requirements
are apparent. First, there must be a clear connection between the
farm program at issue and a specific crop. The analysis of farm pro-
gram payments as proceeds of property of the estate is only credible if
there is clear link between the crops that the debtor produced and the
167. Id. § 541(a)(6). In several cases, debtors have unsuccessfully argued that their
farm program payments fell within the exception for "earnings from services per-
formed" by the debtor and were "earned" by their compliance with the conserva-
tion practices that were required under their contract. See, e.g., In re Holte, 83
B.R. 647 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
168. 11 U.S.C. § 552.
169. Id. § 552(b).
170. See, e.g., In re Stallings, 290 B.R. 777, 783 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003) (rejecting a
creditor's motion to claim an interest in the federal crop reimbusement payments
as proceeds of the debtor's crops under § 552(b)).
171. Id.; see also Kingsley v. First Am. Bank of Casselton (In re Kingsley), 865 F.2d
975 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that deficiency and diversion payments were general
intangibles and not crop proceeds); In re Schmaling, 783 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding that diversion payments were not crop proceeds).
172. See supra Part II.
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specific farm program payments received.17 3 While some regular
farm payments may exhibit this linkage,174 in the context of a bank-
ruptcy, the courts have been most likely to find this connection when
analyzing disaster assistance payments.175
While conceptually, the argument that a disaster assistance pay-
ment is linked to a crop has some appeal, a second requirement
presents a practical problem. Section 541(a)(6) requires that the pro-
ceeds be "from property of the estate."176 Thus, even if the payments
are considered proceeds, they must be proceeds of actual property that
is part of the bankruptcy estate. In many of the farm bankruptcy
cases that involve pre-petition disasters, there is no actual crop in ex-
istence that relates back to the disastrous production cycle. It may
never have grown, or it may be gone long before the bankruptcy. It is
not enough for the program payment to be proceeds of a crop, it must
also be the proceeds of property of the estate, i.e., there must be a
related crop that is already included in the estate. As the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals panel stated in Burgess, "[section] 541(a)(6) and its
reference to proceeds cannot retroactively create a property interest
that did not exist at the commencement of the case."177
In some cases, because of the disaster, there was no crop that was
ever produced at all. For example, in Vote, the debtor did not plant a
crop the year prior to his bankruptcy because the soil was too satu-
rated during the planting season.178 Although Vote did not address
§ 541(a)(6) because it had not been raised in the bankruptcy court,
173. For example, in several consolidated cases, the bankruptcy court in Kelley v.
Thaggard (In re Thaggard), Nos. 01-60571, 01-60575, 01-70513 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
Apr. 3, 2003), searched for a connection between a new peanut support program
passed post-petition and the property that the debtor had as of commencement of
the case. Although the payments received were based on the pre-petition farming
activities of the debtor, the court held that they could not be considered a "pro-
ceed" of any particular crop in existence. Like so many of the current farm pro-
grams, payments are based on historical yield as opposed to current production.
174. See supra Part II.
175. One notable exception to this is found in the case law discussing the few pro-
grams that have called for the destruction of an existing crop in exchange for a
government payment. See, e.g., Pombo v. Ulrich (In re Munger), 495 F.2d 511,
512-13 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that payments under the sugar abandonment
program that called for destruction of existing crop were proceeds of the de-
stroyed crop). In dicta, the court in Schneider expressed agreement with this
analysis, stating that "[aigricultural entitlement payments which result from the
actual disposition of a planted crop are proceeds of that crop." Schneider v. Nazar
(In re Schneider), 864 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir. 1988). But cf. Bank of N. Ark. v.
Owens, 884 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Dairy Termination Program
payments were not proceeds of cattle, but contract payments to farmer who
agreed to dispose of herd and not produce milk).
176. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2000).
177. Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 392 F.3d 782, 787 (5th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted,
403 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2005).
178. Drewes v. Vote (In re Vote), 276 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2002).
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since no crop was ever grown, there was no crop related to the disaster
payment that existed as property of the estate. Thus, the payments
could not be proceeds of non-existent property.
In other cases, the disaster-related crop may not be property of the
estate because there has been significant time elapsed between har-
vest of the damaged crop and either the bankruptcy filing or the even-
tual award of assistance. Any limited or reduced-quality crop that
may have been produced is long gone. This was the case in Bracewell,
where the bankruptcy court held that the disaster payments could not
be considered proceeds under § 541(a)(6) because the crop that the dis-
aster payments provided compensation for was "not in existence"
when the bankruptcy was filed.179 Two years separated the crop dis-
aster and the filing of the Chapter 7.180
In the unpublished, but often cited opinion in White v. United
States (In re White),18 the court argued that a pre-petition "disposi-
tion" of the crop occurred when the disaster struck, destroying the
crop. 182 The disaster payment that resulted was the "proceed" of that
disposition in that it was received as a result of the "disposition."18 3
The court likened the payment to insurance proceeds.t 8 4 The diffi-
culty with this analogy, however, is that in order for a debtor to have
an entitlement to insurance proceeds, there must be an underlying
insurance contract. Applying this analogy to farm programs, if a pre-
petition farm program contract existed, arguably there would be no
need to resort to § 541(a)(6)-the contract would give rise to a right
under § 541(a)(1). In White, however, the farm program contract was
signed post-petition, and therefore no contractual rights existed as of
commencement of the case.18 5
179. Kelley v. Bracewell (In re Bracewell), 310 B.R. 472, 476 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2004),
rev'd on other grounds, 322 B.R. 698 (M.D. Ga. 2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-
11951 (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2005). The district court affirmed this part of the bank-
ruptcy court holding. Bracewell, 322 B.R. at 708-10.
180. Bracewell, 310 B.R. at 473. The crop affected by the disaster was a 2001 crop
that was harvested with reduced yields. The debtor initially filed a Chapter 12
bankruptcy in 2002, but converted the case to Chapter 7 in 2003. The disaster
assistance legislation was not enacted until later in 2003, and the assistance
checks were issued in 2004.
181. No. BRL88-00971C, 1989 WL 146417 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Oct. 27, 1989). White
was a Chapter 12 case, with § 1207 bringing post-petition payments into the es-
tate regardless of the limitations of § 541. At issue was whether an IRS lien at-
tached to the farm program payment prior to bankruptcy. The White court
discussed this issue invoking the same arguments addressed under § 541(a)(6).
182. Id. at *5.
183. Id. at *3.
184. Id.
185. See Kelley v. Bracewell (In re Bracewell), 322 B.R. 698, 709 (M.D. Ga. 2005) (stat-
ing that an insurance analogy "only makes sense if the disaster relief legislation
were enacted pre-petition"), appeal docketed, No. 05-11951 (11th Cir. Apr. 8,
2005). The court further explained that:
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Moreover, the facts provide a limitation to White's analysis. In
White, it appears that some of the debtor's crops were in existence as
property of the estate, a critical factor under § 541(a)(6). In fact,
White cited a Pennsylvania bankruptcy case that confirmed that
under § 541(a)(6), "the critical factor is that, although the right to pay-
ment arose post-petition, the property at issue was pre-petition prop-
erty which became part of the estate." 8 6
This "critical" aspect is not emphasized in the White opinion, and it
is not cited by courts who rely on White for the authority that farm
disaster payments are proceeds under § 541(a)(6). In most cases, the
existence or non-existence of pre-petition crops associated with the
disaster payment is simply not addressed. It can be presumed that
either there are crops in existence or, perhaps more often, that the
court is effectively ignoring this necessary aspect of the analysis.
The most frequently cited case for the proposition that farm disas-
ter payments are proceeds of crops under § 541(a)(6) is the case of
Ring v. Kelley (In re Ring).18 7 However, the only indication as to
whether there is, in fact, any property of the estate to support a pro-
ceeds finding under § 541(a)(6) is that at one point, late in the bank-
ruptcy opinion, the court uses the phrase "since the crops and their
proceeds are property of the estate."18 8 The district court held that
the disaster assistance payments that the debtor received post-peti-
tion were "proceeds" as defined under § 541(a)(6).18 9 In a short opin-
ion affirming the bankruptcy court, the district court stated that the
disaster payments served as a "substitute for proceeds that would
have been recovered 'had the disaster or low yields not occurred.'"'1 90
The bankruptcy court provided more analysis, analogizing the assis-
tance payments to insurance proceeds and citing White. 19 1 As noted,
however, insurance proceeds would necessarily stem from a pre-peti-
[A] crop insurance policy on a pre-petition crop would have been issued
pre-petition. Consequently, the contingent right to enforce the insurance
policy in the event of crop loss would have existed pre-petition and would
have constituted property of the estate together with the crop itself.
Thus, the post-petition payment for a loss covered by the policy is easily
viewed as proceeds of the pre-petition crop by virtue of the pre-petition
policy entitlement.
Id.
186. White, No. BRL88-00971C, 1989 WL 146417, at *4 (quoting Reed v. Philadelphia
Hous. Auth. (In re Reed), 94 B.R. 48, 52-53 (E.D. Pa. 1988)).
187. 160 B.R. 692 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
188. Ring v. Kelley (In re Ring), 169 B.R. 73, 77 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993), affd, 160 B.R.
692 (M.D. Ga. 1993). Presumably, the bankruptcy court opinion was submitted
for publication after it was affirmed by the district court, resulting in a later
citation.
189. Ring, 160 B.R. at 693.
190. Id. (quoting First State Bank of Abernathy v. Holder (In re Nivens), 22 B.R. 287,
291 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); White, No. BRL88-00971C, 1989 WL 146417, at *4).
191. Ring, 169 B.R. at 77.
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tion contract.t 9 2 In Ring, that pre-petition contract existed, forming a
stronger basis for a "property of the estate" finding than that relied
upon by the court. As the case law has developed in the years since
Ring was decided, Ring would have had stronger authority for its out-
come had it relied on the fact that the disaster assistance statute au-
thorizing relief was enacted pre-petition, arguably creating a right
under § 541(a)(1).
Some courts attempt to cover all bases by holding that the disaster
payments are property of the estate under § 541(a)(1), but also in the
alternative, that the payments constituted "proceeds" of debtor's pre-
bankruptcy crops, to be included as estate property under
§ 541(a)(6). 193 Other courts have relied upon Ring, however, in situa-
tions in which there was not a pre-petition disaster assistance
statute.19 4
In an attempt to find property with which to link to proceeds under
§ 541(a)(6), an amicus brief filed in the Burgess rehearing argued that
the pre-petition crop loss experienced by the farmer is itself property
of the estate. 195 According to this argument, the post-petition statute
and ultimate disaster award is the "proceed" of that loss.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Vote rejected a similar ar-
gument, finding that a loss by itself could not be an asset. The court
stated that it had found "no case in which a pure loss with no attend-
ant potential benefit was included as property of the estate."19 6
The amici found two Supreme Court cases from 1842 and 1891 that
it argued would support the finding of a loss as a property asset.197
Each of these cases, however, can be distinguished, and neither in-
volve a loss without "an attendant potential benefit."198
192. The district court in Bracewell distinguished Ring in this regard, finding that the
pre-petition enactment of the disaster program was essential to the court's rea-
soning, at least with respect to its insurance analogy. Bracewell v. Kelley (In re
Bracewell), 322 B.R. 698, 709 (M.D. Ga. 2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-11951
(11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2005). See supra note 185.
193. See, e.g., Boyett v. Moore (In re Boyett), 250 B.R. 817, 822 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000)
(holding that the CLDAP benefits were included in the estate under 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(1) as a result of the pre-petition statute and alternatively under
§ 541(a)(6) as proceeds of "the pre-petition crop"). The court does not discuss
whether there is actually any of the crop that exists as property of the estate.
194. See, e.g., Lemos v. Rakozy (In re Lemos), 243 B.R. 96, 100-01 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1999) (relying upon Ring and White, buttressed by congressional intent to com-
pensate for pre-petition crops).
195. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Susan Block-Lieb et al., Burgess v. Sikes (In re
Burgess), 392 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-30189). This brief was prepared by
the students in the LL.M. Program in Bankruptcy, St. John's University School of
Law, Queens, New York.
196. Drewes v. Vote (In re Vote), 276 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2002).
197. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Susan Block-Lieb et al., supra note 195, at 6-8.
198. See Vote, 276 F.3d at 1027.
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One case involved an international business trade loss that oc-
curred as a result of the Civil War. At the time that the debtors filed
for relief in bankruptcy, related claims had been submitted to an in-
ternational arbitration tribunal in Geneva, the United States had
been awarded compensation, and Congress had begun the process of
distributing the fund. While the ultimate congressional award to the
debtor came after the debtor had filed for relief in bankruptcy, far
more than the "loss" existed pre-petition. The debtor had a clear ex-
pectation that the claim would be paid.1 99
Similarly, in the even earlier case of Milnor v. Metz,200 the debtor
performed pre-petition services as United States gauger. A pre-peti-
tion act of Congress expanded his duties, and the debtor was forced to
request compensation from Congress for the additional services per-
formed. This post-petition compensation for pre-petition services was
at issue. Because of the pre-petition services, the Court held that his
right to payment fell within his assignment of all rights to his credi-
tors. 20 ' Again, more than a "loss" was present, and consistent with
the court's reference in Vote, an "attendant potential benefit"20 2 ex-
isted at the commencement of the case.
Thus in both cases, the debtor had a pre-petition contingent right
to an award. Both cases would be factually more akin to a situation in
which a farmer had applied for loss assistance under an existing assis-
tance program and was awaiting a decision on eligibility.
The amicus brief submitted in the Burgess rehearing argues that
like the awards in these cases, a farmer and his or her lender has a
reasonable expectation that crop losses will be compensated by disas-
ter assistance. In this regard, however, the brief provides an example
of the pervasive lack of understanding of farm programs in general
and, in particular, disaster assistance. 20 3 Many farmers each year
suffer crop losses that are not covered by disaster assistance legisla-
199. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Susan Block-Lieb et al., supra note 195, at 6-8
(citing Williams v. Heard, 140 U.S. 529, 530-38 (1891)).
200. 41 U.S. 221 (1842).
201. Id. at 223.
202. See Vote, 276 F.3d at 1027.
203. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Susan Block-Lieb et al., supra note 195, at
13-14. The amicus brief attempts to support its argument by quoting from a
short article summarizing case law involving farm program payments as security
interests. Id. (citing John K Pearson, Revised Article 9 and Government Entitle-
ment Program Payments, 22 Am. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 55 (Oct. 2003)). Unfortu-
nately, the article is misquoted in the amicus brief. Judge Pearson stated that
"[flarm politics virtually guarantee that there will be additional [farm] programs
in the future." See Pearson, supra, at 55. The brief alters this meaning by in-
serting the bracketed phrase farm [disaster payment] programs. Judge Pearson's
point is that farm programs in one form or another will be with us for a long time,
but he does not direct his comment in any way to the very specific category of
disaster programs.
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tion, and accordingly, the USDA and many farm lenders strongly en-
courage farmers to rely on crop insurance for crop loss protection. 20 4
Disaster assistance legislation is enacted only when losses are exper-
ienced regionally and only when regional losses are of such signifi-
cance that political pressures nudge Congress into action. Producers
have "no way of knowing in advance whether Congress will bail them
out.... [A]d hoc disaster relief is anything but predictable for either
farmers or those footing the bill."205
Moreover, even if disaster legislation is enacted, there is no reason-
able expectation that it will apply to a given farm loss. In order for a
farmer to be eligible for disaster assistance, the losses suffered must
be attributed to a recognized disaster.20 6 The farmer must have indi-
vidually suffered a "qualifying loss," as defined under the specific leg-
islation or implementing regulations. 20 7 Then, the farmer must apply
for the assistance, signing a contract with requirements and potential
liabilities for violation.208
In conclusion, the argument that federal farm program payments
are proceeds of property of the estate under § 541(a)(6) has a superfi-
cial appeal when applied to disaster assistance payments. This ap-
peal, however, does not stand up to careful analysis in most cases.
VI. COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Given the complexity of the issues presented, it is not surprising
that over the years, bankruptcy courts have struggled with the vari-
ous federal farm programs. Trustees have aggressively and creatively
argued that the payments should be brought into the estate in a wide
range of circumstances. Distinctions, however, between the wide ar-
ray of farm programs must be made by the courts. There is no unified
category of "farm program payments." They are diverse in function,
purpose, duration, and obligation, and should be recognized as such.
Based on an analysis of the relevant bankruptcy provisions, the ex-
isting case law, and an analysis of the federal farm programs them-
selves, certain guidelines for future analysis can be developed.
204. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1941.32 (2005) (requiring catastrophic crop insurance as a
condition for obtaining a farm operating loan from the USDA).
205. Johnson, supra note 118, at 545 (contrasting the uncertainty of disaster assis-
tance with the predictability of crop insurance).
206. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1480.4 (2005) (restricting eligibility to those who have lost
crops "as a result of a disaster or related condition"). Note that disaster declara-
tions in and of themselves do not entitle farmers to disaster assistance. They
may trigger eligibility for a low interest disaster loan, but unless disaster legisla-
tion is enacted and funded, no direct assistance is available.
207. See, e.g., id. § 1480.11 (listing the qualifying losses for 2001 and 2002).
208. See, e.g., id §§ 1480.7 (requiring crop insurance for subsequent years), 1480.8 (im-
posing liability for making a false application).
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When evaluating a debtor's rights under a farm program contract
signed pre-petition, courts can be guided by the Matthieson decision
and its prodigy, but they should not follow this lead blindly. The gen-
eral rule first established in Matthieson-that farm programs are es-
sentially contracts between the government and the farmer-is still
sound.
Today's courts, however, should consider the important issues
overlooked by the court in Matthieson. Of particular importance is the
executory nature of some farm program contracts. Related to this is a
specific consideration of the nature of the farm program at issue. This
will involve an inquiry into the contractual obligations imposed upon
the debtor as well as funding and implementation questions. The bet-
ter analysis would be that once the contract has been signed by both
the government and the debtor, the debtor has certain rights under
the contract. These rights, whatever they may be, unless exempted by
the debtor, are property of the bankruptcy estate. They may or may or
may not extend to an immediate payment obligation. If significant
duties remain unperformed, the contract is executory under § 365,
and the trustee can chose to either affirm or reject the contract. If the
trustee affirms the contract, the right to payment that flows from the
contract becomes property of the estate, and the trustee is bound to
perform according to the obligations required by the contract. If the
trustee is unable or unwilling to perform, then the contract should be
rejected.
If, as of commencement of the case, the pre-petition contract was
not executory, i.e., there were no obligations yet to be performed by
the debtor, then it appears that the right to payment itself is a legal
interest of the estate.
Only in very limited circumstances should the court be able to find
a payment to be property of the estate when the contract has not been
signed. The right to participate in a federal farm program by itself
should not usually be considered to be property of the estate.
One such potential circumstance when a court could be justified in
reaching back prior to the contract to find the right to participate in a
program as creating a sufficient right to become property of the estate
is when a pre-petition disaster results in a program that has been en-
acted, funded, and implemented pre-petition. The right of the farmer
to sign up for this program can and should be treated as property of
the estate, even if the contract has not been signed before the bank-
ruptcy is commenced. The district court in Bracewell characterized
this as a contingent right to the program benefits. It is contingent
because the farmer must still meet the "congressionally mandated re-
quirements to qualify" and must perform various administrative
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tasks.20 9 Nevertheless, contingent rights are property of the estate,
subject to their contingency.
In line with Vote, Burgess, and Schmitz, however, no legal right
exists until the program itself exists and is available. Neither crop
losses themselves nor expectations of future benefits rise to the level
of property of the estate. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Vote concluded in its analysis, "[wie have found no case in which a
pure loss with no attendant potential benefit was included as property
of the estate."210
Finally, courts interpreting § 541(a)(6) should be aware that in or-
der for "proceeds" to be properly brought into the estate, they must be
the proceeds of existing property of the estate. Applying this to farm
program payments produces a two part test.
First, the program payment must have a clear nexus to something
beyond the contract obligation. It must be connected to either a spe-
cific crop, to specific livestock, or other tangible property of the debtor.
This test will call for a careful analysis of the farm program that un-
derlies the payment. For example, decoupled program payments
should never be considered to be proceeds, as there is no linkage be-
tween the payment and the debtor's crops. On the other hand, linkage
may be found under some programs that are designed specifically to
provide supplemental income for a particular crop, and are thus "cou-
pled" with specific production. Some of the disaster assistance pro-
grams have this attribute or can be linked to a particular crop loss.
Second, the tangible property to which the payment is connected
must exist and become property of the estate as of commencement of
the case. If there was no crop, or if the crop was destroyed or sold
prior to the bankruptcy, there is no property to which the payment can
be connected under § 541(a)(6). A crop loss by itself is not a property
interest.
The wide array of farm program payments continue to present in-
teresting issues in bankruptcy. As future programs change to meet
international trade, environmental, and budgetary challenges, new
programs are likely to emerge. Whenever a farmer files for relief in
bankruptcy, one should expect a legal struggle to determine, who gets
the check.
209. Kelley v. Bracewell (In re Bracewell), 322 B.R. 698, 706 (M.D. Ga. 2005), appeal
docketed, No. 05-11951 (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2005).
210. Drewes v. Vote (In re Vote), 276 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2002).
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